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The literature on textual analysis of media articles shows that at the aggregate level, negative 
sentiment leads to a reduction in next-day stock market returns. In the first time-series study 
of media-expressed sentiment at the firm level, we extract a negative sentiment measure from 
over five million news articles for the 20 largest nonfinancial US firms over the 10-year 
period from January 2001 to December 2010. When the firm-level data are aggregated, we 
find that, consistent with prior studies at the market level, an increase in negative media 
sentiment (or media pessimism) leads to lower next-day returns. In contrast to prior research, 
however, we show that this is not reversed over the subsequent few days. This suggests that at 
the firm level, media pessimism can have permanent effects and can therefore potentially 
contain  information  relating  to  fundamental  firm  value.  When  we  conduct  vector 
autoregressions on each firm individually over the full 10-year period, this permanent effect is 
observed in only a few firms. Using a series of rolling regressions, we show that this is 
because the relation is episodic in nature. These episodes are dominated by periods during 
which the effects of media pessimism are transitory, but most firms experience at least one 
period during which media pessimism has permanent effects. 
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1.    Introduction 
A nascent area of research in finance involves the textual or linguistic analysis of news media 
to examine its importance in driving stock returns (Tetlock, 2007; Garcia, 2012; Ferguson et 
al., 2013). These studies have found that negative sentiment or pessimism expressed in media 
articles  is  associated  with  lower  subsequent  stock  market  returns.  This  analysis  at  the 
aggregate or market level, however, conceals potentially illuminating firm-level effects, and 
no study has yet conducted a firm-by-firm analysis of the effects on returns of firm-specific 
media pessimism. In this paper, we examine whether the observed relation between aggregate 
media  pessimism  and  market-level  returns  holds  at  the  level  of  the  firm.  Our  data  set 
comprises 20 large US non-financial firms from the Fortune 500 list – Apple, AT&T, Boeing, 
Chevron, Cisco Systems, ConocoPhillips, Dell, Exxon Mobil, Ford Motors, General Electric, 
Hewlett Packard, Home Depot, IBM, Intel, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Microsoft, Pfizer, 
Verizon  Communications,  and  Walmart.  For  the  10-year  period  from  January  2001  to 
December 2010, we extract a measure of media pessimism for each firm from more than 5½ 
million articles sourced from newspapers, industry and trade magazines, blogs, newswires, 
press releases, and web-based publications. This provides us with between 59,000 and 1.1 
million articles for each firm, which is an average of 20 articles per firm each day. 
 
This international news corpus from which we draw our media pessimism measure is many 
orders of magnitude larger than that used in prior studies. Tetlock (2007) uses the “Abreast of 
the Market” column in the Wall Street Journal, Garcia (2012) draws on two columns in the 
New York Times, and Ferguson et al (2013) use articles in four British newspapers. In studying 
the effects of firm-specific media sentiment on the returns of large US stocks, obtaining a 
measure  of  pessimism  that  draws  on  a  larger  and  broader  news  corpus  provides  a  more 
complete and realistic picture of how media sentiment unfolds on a daily basis and drives 
returns. Local newspapers are no longer the principle source of news and information for 
investors; the advent of the internet has seen investors gaining access to a much broader and 
diverse  international  set  of  media  articles  and  commentary.  Further,  there  is  substantial 
international investor interest in large US stocks.     3 
 
An important question in this research area is whether the extent of media pessimism has a 
permanent or transitory effect on returns. Tetlock (2007) argues that his finding of partial 
return reversal following an initial negative stock price reaction to media pessimism suggests 
that the effect is transitory, and constitutes evidence that media pessimism does not contain 
fundamental  information.  More  recent  work  by  Garcia  (2012),  Dougal  et  al  (2012)  and 
Ferguson  et  al  (2013)  is  consistent  with  Tetlock  (2007)  insofar  as  these  authors  find 
incomplete reversal of initially negative effects. In common with prior research, we find that 
when our firm-level data are aggregated (using a panel approach), there is indeed a significant 
negative relation between our measure of media pessimism and next-day returns. In contrast 
to Tetlock (2007), Garcia (2012) and Ferguson et al (2013), however, we find no evidence 
that the initial negative price reaction is reversed over the subsequent few days. This implies 
that at the level of the firm, and drawing upon a measure of sentiment from a corpus of media 
articles  that  is  larger  as  well  as  broader  than  that  used  in  prior  studies,  negative  media 
sentiment  has  a  permanent  effect  on  value  –  and  that  it  contains  information  about 
fundamental asset values. 
 
We next conduct vector autoregressions on each firm individually for the full ten-year period.   
We find that a permanent effect of firm-specific media pessimism on firm-level returns is 
significant only for a few of our sample firms. Using firm-level rolling regressions, we show 
that  this  is  because  the  relation  between  firm-specific  negative  sentiment  and  returns  is 
episodic; that is, there are a few relatively short periods during which firm-specific media 
pessimism  affects  returns.  We  distinguish  between  episodes  in  which  the  effect  of 
firm-specific media pessimism on returns is permanent – and therefore has a fundamental 
effect on firm value – and episodes in which the effect is transitory. The majority of the 
episodes involve transitory effects. However, we find that most of our sample firms have at 
least one ‘permanent’ episode during which the effect of negative media pessimism on returns 
is not fully reversed over the following few days. This is a key finding of our paper – and it 
suggests that media pessimism can contain fundamental value-relevant information. 
 4 
 
The  remainder  of  our  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we  describe  the 
data-collection and generating process, and present summary statistics and analyses of the key 
variables for our sample firms. In Section 3 we present our panel analysis, and in section 4 we 
present our firm-specific VAR and rolling regression analysis. Section 5 summarises our main 
findings and draws together our conclusions. 
2.  Data   
Our sample selection is informed by  three main requirements. First, the corpus of media 
articles needs to have tens of thousands of words in order to allow researchers enough data to 
construct reliable and robust measures of content from the algorithm that is applied to convert 
the text into a score (Wright and Budin, 2001). Second, as we are examining firm-specific 
media reports and firm-level returns using time-series techniques with a daily frequency, we 
need to select firms for which news articles are likely to be available every day. In contrast to 
Tetlock  (2007)  and  Ferguson  et  al  (2013)  who  exclude  dates  with  no  news  articles,  our 
research question and methodology necessitates the use of a continuous time-series of our 
measure of media pessimism, and we wish to minimize the number of days with no news 
articles. Third, our corpus of firm-specific news media articles is international. We therefore 
select firms that are very large and that are potentially of interest to investors all over the 
world.  Our  sample  comprises  the  20  largest  non-financial  US  corporations  on  the  2011 
Fortune 500 list that have a sizeable daily news flow over the 10-year period from 1 January 
2001  to  31  December  2010.
1  They  are Apple,  AT&T, Boeing,  Chevron, Cisco Systems, 
ConocoPhillips, Dell, Exxon Mobil, Ford Motors, General Electric,  Hewlett Packard, Home 
Depot, IBM, Intel, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Microsoft, Pfizer, Verizon Communications, 
and Walmart.   
 
Our corpus of  firm-specific news articles is drawn from the  LexisNexis News and Business 
electronic  news  database’s  ‘all  English  language  news’.    LexisNexis  News  and  Business 
                                                             
1  Three firms have sufficient news stories only during the most recent five or six years; for Exxon Mobil the 
start date in our analysis is  1 Jan 2005, and for ConocoPhillips and Chevron the start date is 1 Jan  2006.   
Because the data sets are truncated for these firms, we use a reduced sample of 17 firms for the panel analysis in 
section 3. 5 
 
comprises  articles  from  newspapers,  blogs,  newswires,  press  releases,  industry  and  trade 
magazines, and web-based publications. The use of a broad range of information sources is 
motivated by the fact that sources of information and opinion are diversifying; newspaper 
readership  is  falling  around  the  world.  Prior  time-series  studies  of  the  effect  of  media 
pessimism on returns use one or two newspaper columns (Tetlock, 2007; Garcia, 2012), or a 
limited  set  of  local  newspapers;  Ferguson  et  al,  (2013)  use  articles  from  four  British 
newspapers: The Financial Times, The Times, The Guardian, and The Mirror. In order to 
conduct  time-series  analysis  of  media  pessimism  at  the  firm  level  using  daily  data,  it  is 
essential that there is a large pool of potential news sources – in order to minimise the number 
of days on which no articles about a particular firm appear. 
 
In compiling our measure of media pessimism, we searched for articles that contained each 
firm’s name in the headline as well as at least five additional mentions in the text. In order to 
ensure that the retrieved articles were written specifically about each particular firm, we chose 
the LexisNexis option ‘strong references only’. We removed articles with a high similarity to 
previously  published content.
2  This is essential because articles are often duplicated as a 
result of national and international newspape r syndication, and also because websites often 
pick up and repeat newspaper and other articles and commentaries.    
 
Our search yielded 5,673,793 articles; for each firm our corpus of media articles is between 
59,000 and 1.1 million articles for the 10-year sample period. Table 1 summarises the media 
article information for each firm. The firms for which we have the greatest number of articles 
are  Microsoft,  Boeing  and  IBM,  with  an  average  of  46,  43  and  37  articles  each  day 
respectively. The column headed ‘Days with zero articles’ shows that we have chosen our 
sample effectively to ensure that there are very few days on which there is no news article 
available. For Microsoft and Verizon at least one article is available for each day (that is, there 
are zero days with no articles), and no firm has more than 30 days on which an article about 
them is not available. To provide a flavour of the breadth of news sources that we use, our 
                                                             
2  This is accomplished using the program Rocksteady, discussed further below. 6 
 
measure of media pessimism for Walmart is derived from 2,281 sources: 833 newspapers, 593 
blogs, 461 newswires and press releases, 165 industry and trade magazines, 137 web-based 
publications, and 92 newsletters and news transcripts. 
 
The most frequently-used content analysis method is the dictionary-based approach, which 
uses a mapping algorithm in which a computer program reads the text and classifies the words 
(or phrases) into categories based on pre-defined dictionary categories or lists (Li, 2008). 
Amongst the most popular word lists are the built-in dictionaries in the General Inquirer (GI) 
software, most of which come from the Harvard IV-4 dictionaries; these have been used by 
Tetlock (2007), Tetlock et all (2008), Engelberg (2008), Feldman et al., (2008), Kothari et al., 
(2008), and Rees and Twedt (2011). These Harvard IV-4 dictionaries are not ideal for use in 
finance research. General-use word lists are likely to omit words that would be considered 
negative  in  the  context  of  financial  reporting  (Henry  and  Leone,  2009).  Loughran  and 
McDonald (2011) find that almost three-quarters of the negative word counts using the GI 
software are attributable to words that are typically not negative in a financial context, and Li 
(2008) finds that its use in a finance setting does not provide a sufficient accuracy rate. We 
use  Loughran  and  McDonald’s  (2011)  (L&M)  finance  dictionary,
3  which  consists of all 
words occurring in 5  percent or more of  10-Ks  from 1994 to 2008 .  Specifically, we use 
L&M’s ‘finance negative’ (FN) list of 2,349 words. These are typically negative in finance 
and  business  contexts;  examples  are  ‘abandon’,  ‘barrier’,  ‘cancel’,  ‘confuse’,  ‘dispute’, 
‘overestimate’, ‘preclude’, and ‘resign’.   
 
We use Rocksteady, a content analysis program developed by Treocht Ltd,
4  to calculate each 
firm’s daily negative word scores. In compiling the time-series measure of negative words, 
the most common approach is to express the percentage of the number of words to the total 
number of words in the text (Kothari et al., 2008). We count the frequency of FN words and 
express this count as a proportion of the total words in the day’s articles pertaining to each 
                                                             
3  See http://nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html. The L&M finance dictionary has also been used by Doran et al (2010), 
Garcia (2012), Chen et al., (2012) Jegadeesh and Wu (2012) and Rees and Twedt (2012). 
4  Treocht Ltd., (www.treocht.com) is an Ireland-based company developing a web-based system that uses fusion analytics to 
deliver financial predictions. 7 
 
firm. By setting the sentiment score to be zero on days on which there is no article, the final 
FN score data series are obtained. Note that the FN series is configured such that an increase 
in FN indicates greater media pessimism. 
 
Daily closing prices and trading volumes for each firm are from Datastream. Stock prices are 
adjusted for dividends and splits, and the trading volumes are adjusted for capital events and 
divided by 1,000.  Table 2 presents summary information on the sample firms as well as the 
FN negative words series. Columns (1) to (4) show respectively size by market capitalization 
(as at November 2011), annual revenue (from the 2011 Fortune 500 list), annualized average 
return, and trading volume – the average daily number of shares traded. Columns 5 to 9 
contain descriptive statistics for the FN score series: mean, median, maximum, variance and 
skewness.  The  FN  series  for  all  firms  are  positively  skewed  but  not  excessively  so.  
Ljung-Box Q test for autocorrelation show that the FN series is serially correlated up to the 
10
th lag, and Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests confirm that all of the FN series are stationary (not 
reported in the table). For the measure of stock trading volume, we follow Lo and Wang 
(2000), and define the turnover of stock j at time t as                        ⁄ , where       is the 
number of firm j’s shares traded at time t, and       is the total number of shares outstanding of 
firm j. Turnover is not detrended because Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests show that a unit root is 
easily rejected for each series. 
 
Comparison of the firm-level returns (column 2 of Table 2) with the mean of the firm-specific 
FN series (column 5) provides an initial look at the relation between each firm’s stock returns 
and its measure of media pessimism. As might be expected, a very high negative word score 
is associated with poor returns. Pfizer’s return of -5 percent is accompanied by an average FN 
score of 1.52 – which is the highest of all 20 sample firms. Walmart and Merck have the next 
highest FN scores (1.51 and 1.50 respectively), and also have the third and fourth lowest 




3.    Panel analysis   
We begin by using a panel approach with fixed effects to examine whether our measure of 
firm-specific negative words (FN) predicts firm-level returns. To facilitate the construction of 
a balanced panel, only the 17 firms with the full 10 years of news data are included; this 
yields a panel with 2,515 observations per firm and 42,704 observations in total. We estimate 
three groups of models to examine the relation between firm-specific sentiment, firm-level 
returns and trading volumes. These are presented in equations (1) to (3): 
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In these models,  𝑅𝑖 is the firm’s stock return,  𝑉𝑖  is the firm’s stock turnover, and  𝐹 𝑖 is the 
firm-specific negative sentiment measure.    In equation (1) we regress firm-level return,  𝑅𝑖 , 
on  five  lags  of  itself,  on  five  lags  of  turnover  and  FN,  and  on  two  dummy  variables 
controlling for Monday and January effects – DMon and DJan.    In equation (2), firm-level 
turnover (V) is the dependent variable, and in equation (3) firm-specific media pessimism (FN) 
is the dependent variable.   
 
The results for models (1)–(3), estimated with Huber-White standard errors, are presented in 
Table 3.
5  Columns (1) to (3) present our estimates with firm-level returns as the  dependent 
                                                             
5  We use several other approaches to estimation, including a pooled approach, abnormal returns in lieu of returns, 
and winsorised returns. The results are similar, and available from the authors on request. 9 
 
variable (equation (1)); trading volume is the dependent in columns (4) to (6) (equation (2)), 
and in columns (7) to (9) FN is the dependent variable (equation (3)). Recall that our measure 
of negative sentiment FN is configured so that the greater the proportion of negative words 
the higher the FN score. We therefore expect to find a negative sign on the coefficient for FN, 
indicating that the greater the count of negative words, the lower the subsequent return. As 
seen  in  column  3  of  Table  3,  in  the  return  equation  the  first  lag  of  FN  is  negative  and 
significant at the 5 percent level. This is consistent with prior research using aggregate market 
indicators – that greater media pessimism predicts lower next-day returns.   
 
In  contrast  to  the  findings  of  Tetlock  (2007),  Garcia  (2012)  and  Ferguson  et  al  (2013), 
however, we find no evidence that the initial negative shock to returns following a rise in 
media pessimism sentiment is followed by partial reversal. Rather, we find strong evidence of 
no reversal. Lags 1 to 5 are jointly significant at the 5 percent level, whereas lags 2 to 5 are 
jointly highly insignificant (p = 0.74). According to the interpretation of Tetlock (2007), our 
finding  suggests  that  at  the  firm  level,  firm-specific  media  pessimism  has  persistent  or 
permanent effects on firm-level returns. 
 
The coefficient of FN in the return equation of 0.00041 suggests that a 1-unit increase in FN 
reduces next day return by 0.041 percent, which equates to an annualised return of just over 
10 percent. Given that the means of the FN series for the sample firms (Table 2) are between 
0.85 and 1.5, a 1-unit increase in FN represents a major shock to the sentiment series – an 
approximate doubling of the count of negative words in the various source texts.    It could be 
argued, a lá Antweiler and Frank (2004) and Loughran and McDonald (2011), that although 
statistically  significant,  stock  price  reactions  to  media  content  are  economically  small.   
However,  we  advance  an  alternative  potential  explanation:  at  the  firm  level,  stock  price 
reaction to media pessimism is likely to occur intermittently. We analyse this possibility in 
our firm-level analysis in section 4. 
 
In the results for the volume equation, the first lag of FN is negative and significant at the 5 10 
 
percent level (column 5), suggesting that a rise in the negative word count is followed by 
lower trading volumes the next day. The fourth and fifth lags of FN are also negative and 
highly significant (at the 1 percent level). For the FN equation, we find firstly that negative 
firm-level returns result in greater firm-specific media pessimism the next day; the coefficient 
on the first lag of return is highly significant (p = 0.00) and negative as is the coefficient on 
the third lag. These results are consistent with Tetlock (2007), who finds that not only does 
negative sentiment affect next-day returns, but that the causal link is also reversed – negative 
returns leads to greater next-day media pessimism. Finally, we find that a rise in firm-level 
trading volume is followed by a rise in negative firm-level sentiment the next day, although 
this effect reverses over the following few days – lags 2 to 5 all have highly significant 
negative coefficients. 
 
Our findings also suggest the possibility of an indirect effect of FN on returns – via volumes.   
We find that FN predicts lower volumes (significant at lags 1, 4 and 5 in the volume equation), 
and we also find in the return equation that lower volumes are associated with a reduction in 
returns (the coefficient on the fourth lag of turnover is positive and significant). The VAR 
analysis in the next section enables us to tease out any potential indirect effects. 
 
4.    Analysis of each firm individually 
4.1  VAR modelling over the full period 
Our VAR models take the familiar form: 
  t t t u By x L A   ) (                                   (4) 
with   
  A L A L A L A L p
p ( ) ......      1 1 2
2 , 
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) FN , V , R ( x t t t t = , and  ) Djan , DMon , Const ( y t t =  
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This is a standard VAR representation in which x is a  ) 1 3 (    vector of endogenous variables, 
A  is a  ) 3 3 (    matrix of coefficients,  u is a  ) 1 3 (    vector of white noise disturbance terms, 
and  Ldenotes the lag operator (for example, L x x
i
t t i   ). The y vector contains the constant 
term, Const, and the controls DMon and DJan. These VAR models allow us to examine the 
full  range  of  interaction  between  firm-level  returns,  trading  volumes  and  firm-specific 
sentiment over the period available for each firm. 
 
A convenient feature of the VAR representation in (4) is that it can be estimated by ordinary 
least squares, which yields consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of the Amatrix 
because the right-hand-side variables are predetermined and are the same in each equation of 
the model. The first step in the estimation process is to decide on the appropriate lag length 
( p). Following Hakkio and Morris (1984), we work out the appropriate lag length by setting 
the maximum to 5 days, and using likelihood ratio tests to examine each restriction against all 
other  possibilities with the  Akaike  Information  Criterion. Five  lags  is  the  appropriate  lag 
length. 
 
Table 4 displays summary results of the VAR models. The table presents the F-statistics and 
associated  p-values  indicating  the  joint  signiﬁcance  of  all  five  lags  of  each  explanatory 
variable in the equation. The three headings ‘Return equation’, ‘Volume equation’ and ‘FN 
equation’ denote the dependent variable in the vector of endogenous variables, and the three 
columns  beneath  each,  labelled  R,  V  and  FN,  are  the  main  explanatory  variables.  The 
strongest relation is volumes causing FN (column 8); this is significant at the 5 percent level 
or better for 15 of the 20 firms. Returns causing volumes is also strong; in 14 cases this 
relation is significant at the 5 percent level (column 4). FN causing volumes (column 6) is 
significant at the 5 percent level for 6 firms.   
 
On the important question of whether firm-specific sentiment causes firm-level returns that 
persist, we find that this occurs at standard levels of significance for only one firm (Dell), and 12 
 
for another three firms at the 10 percent level (ExxonMobil, GE and Verizon). Two firms – 
Ford Motor and GE – show indirect causality from FN to returns via volumes; that is, FN 
affects volumes and volumes cause returns (at the 5 percent level or better). It is clear that 
even when including firms for which we find indirect effects, there are few – five out of a 
sample of 20 – where firm-specific negative sentiment causes persistent firm-level returns at 
standard levels of significance. 
 
In section 3, we found evidence from our panel estimation for a significant (but perhaps not 
economically large) negative effect on firm-level returns of firm-specific media pessimism, 
and that this effect is not reversed within the week. When looking for this phenomenon at the 
individual firm level, however, we find few firms that experience this ‘permanent’ effect of 
media pessimism on returns. It is possible that this can be explained by the fact that most of 
the time during our 10-year period, there is a weak or non-existent relation between negative 
firm-specific  negative  sentiment  and  firm-level  returns,  and  that  significant  effects  are 
concentrated in short bursts. Indeed, this is intuitive because the volatility clustering and news 
arrival  literature  suggests  that  news  events  (that  are  likely  to  trigger  firm-specific  media 
commentary) occur intermittently. 
 
4.2  VAR modelling over rolling-window periods 
We examine the possibility that negative news coverage has an effect on stock returns only 
intermittently  by  conducting  rolling  regressions  for  each  firm.  Using  the  VAR  approach 
allows us to capture indirect as well as direct  effects; that is, negative sentiment directly 
affecting returns as well as indirectly via volumes. Again we assume that the error terms  ?  
in equation (4) are independent, allowing us to estimate each equation using OLS separately.  
We use a one-year (252-day) window that is rolled forward a day at a time.     
 
We want to distinguish between periods  during which media pessimism has a permanent 
effect on stock prices and periods when media pessimism has a transitory effect. In the former 
case, negative media sentiment contains fundamental information about firm value, and we 13 
 
define  these  as  periods  in  which  there  is  either  no  return  reversal  or  partial  reversal.   
Transitory effects are periods during which return reversal is complete. We identify each of 
these periods as follows. A permanent episode is a period during which (at the 10 percent 
level) the first lag of FN is significantly negative, and lags 1 to 5 are jointly significant. (As 
expected, all cases of the significance of FN on returns at lag 1 are negative.) A transitory 
episode is identified as a period during which the first lag of FN is significantly negative, and 
lags 1 to 5 are jointly insignificant. 
 
Table 5 summarises for each firm the periods or episodes during which negative sentiment is 
followed by a permanent decline in returns (‘Permanent’), and when the initial negative shock 
to returns reverses (‘Transitory’). For each, we detail the number of significant episodes and 
the proportion of the 10-year period during which significant episodes occur. Given that we 
are using a one-year rolling regression window, each period is at least one year long, except 
for periods at the start of the period (which is January 2002). The periods are depicted in 
Figure 1 for two firms – Ford Motor and Home Depot. It is possible (as can be seen for both 
Ford and Home Depot) that the periods of permanent and transitory effects can overlap.   
 
The results in Table 5 show clearly that the effect of negative media-expressed sentiment on 
returns  is  episodic,  and  that  the  effects  for  each  firm  differ.  Transitory  effects  dominate 
permanent – by a factor of more than 2 to 1. The mean number of transitory episodes at 2.6 is 
more than twice the mean number of permanent episodes at 1.25. A similar ratio is found 
when we calculate the percentage of time in the 10-year period during which transitory and 
permanent effects are found – 39.6 percent for transitory and 20.1 for permanent. Three firms 
– AT&T, Chevron, and IBM – have no permanent episodes; for these firms, the effect of 
media-expressed negative sentiment is transitory only. While for most firms transitory effects 
dominate permanent, this reverses for 4 of our sample firms; that is, the proportion of the 
10-year period during which there are permanent episodes is greater than the proportion of 
transitory episodes. These firms are Apple, ExxonMobil, Johnson & Johnson, and Walmart. 
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Our findings make it clear that full-period tests of the relation between media pessimism and 
returns may not be appropriate insofar as a significant relation occurs only intermittently. An 
explanation  for  these  findings  can  be  found  in  the  volatility  clustering  and  news  arrival 
literature.  This  literature  suggests  that  news  arrives  to  the  market  in  bursts  followed  by 
periods of relative quiet, and the implications for firm-level and market-level news is likely to 
be different (Andersen, 1996). Further, the predictable flow of regular corporate disclosures 
can be classified as ‘normal’ news, and this is distinct from ‘unusual’ news events (Maheu and 
McCurdy, 2004; Bali, Scherbina and Tang, 2009).   
 
In  Table  6,  we  present  for  each  firm  the  dates  of  the  periods  during  which  we  found  a 
permanent effect of negative sentiment on returns, and it includes a précis of newsworthy 
events  that  occurred  during  these  periods.  In  order  to  construct  Table  6,  we  conducted 
searches  via  Proquest  for  firm-specific  events  that  might  have  triggered  pessimism  the 
worldwide media. Examples include:   
 
  Home Depot’s CEO Robert Nardelli stepping down in January 2007 after extensive 
criticism of his compensation package.   
  Merck’s July 2002 admission that it had overstated its revenues and costs by $14 
billion over three years. 
  Microsoft’s requirement to pay massive penalties in April 2004 to settle its antitrust 
case with the European Commission.   
  Pfizer’s  $49  million  settlement  of  allegations  in  October  2002  that  it  fraudulently 
avoided paying Medicaid rebates for the cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor.   
  Verizon’s  May  2006  lawsuit  over  claims  it  gave  phone  records  to  the  National 
Security Agency.   
  Walmart’s March 2005 $11 million settlement of federal allegations that it used illegal 
immigrants  to  clean  its  stores,  and  its  $78.5  million  fine  in  2006  for  violating 
Pennsylvania labor laws. 
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The  occasions  when  our  firm-specific  measure  of  media  pessimism  significantly  and 
persistently leads to a reduction in firms’ returns trace a chronological narrative of disastrous 
firm-specific business events, including corporate errors, lawsuits and governance scandals. 
In  short,  these  events  are  dominated  by  revelations  of  managerial  misconduct  that  are 
associated with severe reputational damage to the firms. Our findings may be explained by 
the fact that that these unusual information events trigger days (and possibly weeks) of critical 
media analysis and debate. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In  this  paper,  our  main  research  question  has  related  to  whether  firm-specific  media 
pessimism is associated with lower subsequent firm stock market returns, and whether any 
initial negative price reaction is subsequently reversed. Using a unique data set comprising 20 
large US non-financial firms over the period from January 2001 to December 2010, and a 
measure of negative sentiment extracted from over 5 million media articles, we have shown 
that when our firm-level data are aggregated, there is a significant negative relation between 
media pessimism and next-day returns. This is consistent with prior literature (Tetlock, 2007; 
Garcia, 2012; Ferguson et al., 2013). What is not consistent with prior literature, however, is 
that we find no evidence that the initial return reaction to media pessimism reverses over the 
subsequent few days. This implies that at the level of the firm negative media content contains 
information about fundamental asset values. 
 
In firm-by-firm time-series analysis using the full data period, we find that the apparently 
permanent effect of media pessimism on returns is significant for few of our sample firms.   
We suggest that this is because a significant relation between firm-specific media pessimism 
and persistent firm-level negative returns may occur only intermittently. In rolling regression 
analysis, we show, consistent  with this  argument,  that this  relation  is indeed episodic.  In 
separating permanent from transitory effects, we show that while periods of transitory effects 
vastly outweigh those in which a there is a permanent effect of pessimistic media sentiment 
on returns, all but three firms also have at least one period during which the effect of media 16 
 
sentiment has a permanent effect – that is, pessimism fundamentally affects equity value.   
 
The volatility clustering and news arrival literature – which suggests that news arrives in 
‘bursts’ – helps to explain our finding that the persistence of firm-specific negative sentiment 
on  firm  returns  is  episodic.  Consistent  with  the  volatility  and  news  arrival  literature,  we 
confirm that the periods during which firm-specific sentiment leads to persistently negative 
firm-level returns can be traced back to unusual news events that may be difficult to interpret 
in  their  implications  for  fundamental  values.  As  the  bad  news  story  unfolds,  market 
participants have the opportunity to re-interpret their initial views on the implications for 
valuation. Future research might address this question directly – that is, for what kinds of 
news events might media sentiment have a fundamental effect on firm value, and what events 
would have a transitory effect?   
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Table 1 
Summary statistics – news corpus 
 
 
Articles per day    Negative words per day 
 




  Average    Median 
               
Apple  20  12  355  14    10,714  6,430 
AT&T  16  13  180  4    9,310  6,912 
Boeing  43  38  258  2    21,031  16,617 
Chevron  14  12  89  8    6,731  5,159 
Cisco  20  16  158  6    12,369  8,850 
ConocoPhillips  10  8  79  5    6,174  4,284 
Dell  22  18  175  2    11,280  8,219 
ExxonMobil  10  7  101  19    5,702  3,514 
Ford Motor  11  9  128  4    7,080  4,824 
General Electric  20  16  157  9    9,735  7,099 
Home Depot  11  8  114  11    6,570  4,255 
HP  13  9  154  15    7,792  5,107 
IBM  37  33  206  6    19,679  16,589 
Intel  18  14  114  8    9,694  6,720 
Johnson & Johnson  11  8  95  30    5,516  3,275 
Merck  13  9  221  26    9,036  5,166 
Microsoft  46  41  352  0    24,590  20,736 
Pfizer  17  14  266  5    9,949  7,281 
Verizon  28  24  192  0    16,167  13,480 





   
Notes. This table presents summary information on the number of articles collected for each firm, and the 
number of negative words per day extracted from each firm’s news corpus.    The total number of days is 





Summary statistics – firm characteristics and FN scores 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 












Mean   Median  Max  Variance  Skew 
Apple  357.3  65.2  68.3  22.6 
 
1.05  0.95  5.30  0.30  1.70 
AT&T  172.2  124.6  2.1  17.6 
 
1.05  0.94  6.02  0.37  1.98 
Boeing  49.9  64.3  7.8  4.8 
 
1.35  1.28  4.14  0.22  1.11 
Chevron  211.0  196.3  14.3  11.4 
 
1.40  1.30  5.28  0.48  1.16 
Cisco  101.6  40.0  3.2  60.5 
 
0.85  0.75  4.80  0.23  2.22 
ConocoPhillips  95.0  185.0  9.8  12.1 
 
1.14  1.08  7.48  0.29  2.39 
Dell  28.2  61.5  3.5  23.7 
 
1.04  0.95  4.30  0.22  1.45 
ExxonMobil  376.9  354.7  10.4  25.5 
 
1.51  1.35  6.41  0.77  1.47 
Ford Motor  41.3  129.0  28.4  37.0 
 
1.27  1.14  6.25  0.53  1.30 
General Electric  169.8  151.6  -1.3  44.3 
 
1.03  0.95  3.68  0.22  1.19 
Home Depot  59.3  68.0  3.9  12.9 
 
1.20  1.10  4.70  0.37  1.29 
HP  54.6  126.0  8.9  14.0 
 
0.93  0.77  5.50  0.40  2.22 
IBM  220.0  99.9  10.7  7.5 
 
0.85  0.79  2.66  0.10  1.49 
Intel  127.5  43.6  6.4  62.8 
 
0.92  0.77  5.48  0.37  2.19 
Johnson & Johnson  176.4  61.6  4.9  10.0 
 
1.43  1.31  7.36  0.59  1.29 
Merck  108.0  46.0  -0.6  11.5 
 
1.51  1.41  6.99  0.62  1.03 
Microsoft  222.9  62.5  9.4  68.6 
 
1.22  1.07  3.70  0.32  1.41 
Pfizer  152.3  67.8  -5.1  33.3 
 
1.53  1.44  6.03  0.39  1.43 
Verizon  104.5  106.6  3.5  12.3 
 
1.26  1.20  5.27  0.21  1.66 
Walmart  197.7  421.8  1.8  13.6 
 




Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for firm variables size, revenue, return and trading volume 
(columns  1  to  4),  and  for  the  finance  negative  (FN)  score  series  (columns  5  to  8).    Size  is  market 
capitalisation on 15
th November, 2011, and revenue is drawn from the 2011 Fortune 500 list.    Return is 






Panel estimates of firm-level textual sentiment and returns 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Return equation    Volume equation    FN equation 
 
R  V  FN    R  V  FN    R  V  FN 
Lag 1  -1.794  3.038  -0.044    -0.905  55.176  -0.007    -63.870  512.000  26.153 
 
0.06  0.12  0.05    0.00  0.00  0.10    0.00  0.02  0.00 
Lag 2  -3.161  2.336  0.016    -0.080  8.625  -0.001    0.546  -111.562  6.546 
 
0.05  0.63  0.57    0.70  0.00  0.84    0.94  0.25  0.00 
Lag 3   0.721  -5.825  -0.020    -0.178  2.803  0.003    -38.492  -137.933  5.499 
 
0.390  0.03  0.35    0.04  0.15  0.52    0.00  0.22  0.00 
Lag 4  -0.049  11.141  -0.027    0.058  10.856  -0.011    -20.750  -130.573  6.214 
 
0.960  0.00  0.11    0.55  0.00  0.23    0.15  0.12  0.00 
Lag 5  -1.838  -3.671  0.025    -0.109  7.709  -0.007    -24.159  -47.845  8.252 
 
0.01  0.09  0.12    0.52  0.00  0.08    0.14  0.58  0.00 
Sum of lags 1 to 5      -0.051                 
χ
2 [joint]       4.27                 
  p-value      0.05                 
Sum of lags 2 to 5      -0.006                 
χ
2 [reversal]      0.12                 
  p-value      0.74                 
 
Notes. This table provides panel estimates (with fixed effects) of the relation between returns, trading volumes and media pessimism, using 42,704 daily 
observations from 17 firms over the 10 year period from January 2001 to December 2010. Columns (1) to (3) present the results for estimating the return 
equation (1), columns (4) to (6) present the results from estimating the volume equation, and columns (7) to (9) present the results for the media pessimism 
(FN) equation (3). R denotes is firm-level equity returns, V is turnover, and FN is our measure of media pessimism.    As well as 5 lags of R, V and FN, the 
equations include Monday and January dummies. Coefficients have been multiplied by 100.    P-values appear under the coefficients; for those significant at 
the 5 percent level or better the p-value is in bold. 22 
 
 
Table 4   
Individual firm-level VAR models   
    (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
    Return equation    Volume equation    FN equation 
    R  V  FN    R  V  FN    R  V  FN 
Apple   
2.84  1.46  0.73    3.64  757.53  2.62    1.59  4.13  78.87 
0.01  0.20  0.60    0.00  0.00  0.02    0.16  0.00  0.00 
AT&T   
2.51  0.40  1.08    4.79  898.52  5.88    0.17  14.71  43.89 
0.03  0.85  0.37    0.00  0.00  0.00    0.97  0.00  0.00 
Boeing   
2.65  1.05  1.66    8.57  370.92  1.64    0.60  7.65  141.90 
0.02  0.39  0.14    0.00  0.00  0.15    0.70  0.00  0.00 
Chevron   
12.17  2.41  0.30    13.86  387.83  0.71    0.90  1.41  38.01 
0.00  0.05  0.88    0.00  0.00  0.58    0.46  0.23  0.00 
Cisco   
2.38  0.80  0.39    2.10  229.60  0.52    1.24  18.52  47.64 
0.04  0.55  0.85    0.06  0.00  0.76    0.29  0.00  0.00 
ConocoPhillips  5.21  1.38  1.12    13.96  216.01  0.46    0.66  2.94  6.88 
0.00  0.23  0.35    0.00  0.00  0.81    0.66  0.01  0.00 
Dell   
4.29  1.08  2.52    0.68  223.77  0.32    2.80  6.40  56.40 
0.00  0.37  0.03    0.64  0.00  0.90    0.02  0.00  0.00 
Exxon Mobil  16.88  1.10  2.04    11.44  392.71  1.62    0.39  3.50  35.06 
0.00  0.36  0.07    0.00  0.00  0.15    0.86  0.00  0.00 
Ford Motor  5.76  2.32  1.03    5.42  885.65  5.00    1.47  8.05  44.36 
0.00  0.04  0.40    0.00  0.00  0.00    0.20  0.00  0.00 
GE   
1.24  5.66  1.92    15.38  1378.31  2.44    3.19  4.52  37.83 
0.29  0.00  0.09    0.00  0.00  0.03    0.01  0.00  0.00 
Home Depot  2.33  1.77  0.44    3.90  587.48  2.29    1.44  13.23  11.65 
0.04  0.12  0.82    0.00  0.00  0.04    0.21  0.00  0.00 
HP   
1.04  0.87  1.56    1.68  223.01  0.79    0.45  4.53  142.86 
0.39  0.50  0.17    0.14  0.00  0.56    0.81  0.00  0.00 
IBM   
1.49  2.84  0.51    5.76  369.52  0.68    0.74  4.62  68.78 
0.19  0.01  0.77    0.00  0.00  0.64    0.60  0.00  0.00 
Intel   
3.43  0.79  0.43    1.07  205.02  2.17    0.34  1.28  80.66 
0.00  0.56  0.83    0.37  0.00  0.06    0.89  0.27  0.00 
J & J  5.24  1.55  1.22    6.86  490.58  3.07    1.10  2.29  45.13 
0.00  0.17  0.30    0.00  0.00  0.01    0.36  0.04  0.00 
Merck   
0.62  0.60  0.49    2.35  384.49  0.73    2.52  1.28  105.04 
0.69  0.70  0.78    0.04  0.00  0.60    0.03  0.27  0.00 
Microsoft   
6.74  0.87  1.20    3.08  219.59  1.44    0.89  1.28  250.65 
0.00  0.50  0.31    0.01  0.00  0.21    0.49  0.27  0.00 
Pfizer   
6.49  1.56  0.63    1.21  812.70  0.28    2.07  0.18  48.21 
0.00  0.17  0.67    0.30  0.00  0.92    0.07  0.97  0.00 
Verizon   
3.70  0.45  2.14    3.05  645.44  1.88    1.55  4.84  48.42 
0.00  0.81  0.06    0.01  0.00  0.10    0.17  0.00  0.00 
Walmart   
5.96  0.93  0.98    2.38  546.00  0.98    0.94  2.01  29.69 
0.00  0.46  0.43    0.04  0.00  0.43    0.45  0.07  0.00 
 
 
N   
   
Notes: This table presents VAR estimates of the model in equation (4) on 2,509 daily observations over the 
10-year sample period from January 2001 to December 2010 for all firms (except 1,253 observations for 
Chevron and ConocoPhillips, and 1,253 for Exxon Mobil). Columns (1)-(3), (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) provide the 
estimates for each firm of the ‘Return’ ‘Volume’ and ‘FN’ equations within the VAR. The F-statistics with 




Table 5   
Individual firm-level VAR models – rolling regression analysis 
 
Permanent    Transitory 
 
No. 
episodes  % of time   
No. 
episodes  % of time 
Apple  2  27.0 
 
2  25.9 
AT&T  0  0.0 
 
3  29.4 
Boeing  1  13.1 
 
4  51.4 
Chevron  0  0.0 
 
3  51.6 
Cisco  1  21.0 
 
2  26.6 
ConocoPhillips  1  29.9 
 
2  69.6 
Dell  1  8.2 
 
2  20.2 
ExxonMobil  2  64.1 
 
3  52.9 
Ford Motor  1  14.0 
 
4  50.9 
GE  2  24.7 
 
3  74.7 
Home Depot  1  12.7 
 
3  35.5 
HP  2  24.7 
 
2  39.3 
IBM  0  0.0 
 
2  20.5 
Intel  1  11.7 
 
1  24.3 
Johnson & Johnson  1  13.7 
 
1  12.4 
Merck  2  18.2 
 
3  34.7 
Microsoft  2  26.2 
 
3  54.4 
Pfizer  1  11.3 
 
3  35.9 
Verizon  2  37.5 
 
3  39.0 
Walmart  2  44.0 
 
3  42.7 
            sum  25 
   
52 
  mean  1.25  20.1 
 
2.6  39.6 








Notes.  In this table, we report the percentage of time that the first lag of 
negative sentiment (FN) significantly and negatively affects returns (R) for 
each  firm,  directly  and  indirectly  (via  volumes),  using  VAR  regressions 
(equation  4).  The  columns  headed  ‘permanent’  report  the  number  of 
significant  episodes  and  proportion  of  time  in  which  the  lag  of  FN  is 
significant and negative, and lags 1 to 5 of FN are jointly significant at the 
10 percent level or better. The columns headed ‘transitory’ report the number 
of significant episodes and proportion of time in which the lag of  FN is 
significant and lags 1 to 5 of FN are jointly insignificant.    Transitory and 
permanent episodes can overlap. 24 
 
Table 6 
Episodes of permanent effects of negative sentiment on returns 
 
Firms and episodes          Newsworthy events  
 
Apple 
09/05/2002 - 23/07/2003:  October 2002: Net loss of $45 million following profits of $66 million the 
previous year. April 2003: Profits down a further 65 percent in quarter from 
the previous year. 
21/11/2008 - 3/03/2010:  January 2009: CEO Steve Jobs takes a 6-month medical leave of absence. 
January 2010: Apple faces litigation from Fujitsu and STMicroelectronics 
over its iPad name. 
 
Boeing  
14/01/2002 - 17/3/2003:  Jan 2002: Boeing 727 jet crashed killing all on board. Oct 2002: Loss of big 
order and drop in production. Jan 2003: Fourth-quarter profit before special 
items fell sharply from a year earlier.   
 
Cisco  
3/12/2007 - 19/10/2009:  July 2008: The US equity market enters bear territory as a downbeat forecast 
of Cisco revenue growth in Europe and the US drags its stock price down by 
5.7 percent, while the tech sector and the overall market S&P decline by over 
3 and 2 percent respectively. 
 
ConocoPhillips 
5/09/2008 - 10/11/2009:  Jan 2009: Posted an enormous fourth-quarter loss. Jul 2009: Second-quarter 
profit fell 76 percent. 
 
Dell  




10/01/2006 - 9/08/2006:  April 2006: ExxonMobil reports record profit of $36 billion; the company 
plays it down.  March 2006: the Senate Judiciary Committee investigates the 
market power of big oil; ExxonMobil denies that concentration in the US oil 
industry has led to higher prices at the petrol pump. 
22/10/2007 - 1/06/2010:  Oct 2008: ExxonMobil posts biggest US quarterly profit ever. Apr 2009: 
Exxon  Mobil  Beats  Wal-Mart  in  2009  Fortune  500  List.  Jul  2009: 
Second-quarter profit tumbled 66 percent. 
Ford Motor  
11/05/2005 - 11/08/2006:  Jan 2006: Ford Motor Company to cut 29,000 US jobs. Oct 2006: Largest 
loss in a quarter in 14 years, slashing 45,000 jobs. Jan 2007: The biggest 





18/01/2005 - 18/01/2006:  June 2005: racial  discrimination lawsuit launched by an  Africa-American 
employee. 
17/09/2007 - 26/11/2008:  October: GE needs an emergency injection of $15 billion cash injection to 
survive the global financial crisis. Its stock price plummets more than 50% 
from a year earlier, shedding $200 billion of its market value. 
 
Home Depot  




31/05/2002 - 3/06/2003:  May 2003: IT sector CEOs go public that the  good times are over,  with 
spending on technology in its third year of decline and cost-saving is now 
the norm.   
16/10/2009 - 31/12/2010:  August 2010: CEO Mark Hurd sacked over expense filings, and in October, 
the  new  CEO  Leo  Apotheker  draws  furious  reaction  from  institutional 
investors and Oracle CEO Larry Ellison  who accuses HP’s  new  CEO of 
stealing Oracle software when he was CEO of SAP. 
 
Intel 
28/05/2002 - 13/06/2003:  March 2003: Intel lowers its growth forecasts after weak sales of chips for 
mobile phones and other electronic devices dragged the overall outlook lower. 
The stock price falls by 4 percent. 
 
Johnson & Johnson 




14/01/2002 – 12/08/2002:  Jul 2002: Merck admitted that it had overstated its revenues and costs by 
some $14 billion over three years.   
05/05/2003 – 24/07/2004 
 
Microsoft  
9/04/2003 - 13/07/2004:  Mar 2004: Microsoft is facing penalties and fines in the antitrust case with 
the European Commission. 
17/06/2007 - 8/07/2008:      May 2008: Microsoft dropped its historic acquisition attempt on Yahoo. 
 
Pfizer  
28/10/2002 - 31/10/2003:  Oct 2002: Pfizer will pay $49 million to settle claims that it fraudulently 






4/01/2005 - 6/03/2007:  March-May 2006: Investors balk at a hefty pay rise for the CEO. 
May 2006: Verizon faces a lawsuit over claims it gave phone records to the 
National Security Agency.  
June 2006: Will pay $48.9 million to settle a 2002 lawsuit that it discriminated 
against 12,326 current and former pregnant women employees. 
26/11/2008 - 8/02/2010:  The US Federal Communications Commission announces an industry-wide 
investigation into competition in the mobile phone sector that is dominated 
by the big four wireless operators, including AT&T and Verizon. 
 
Walmart  
21/03/2005 - 19/09/2006:  Mar 2005: Wal-Mart agreed to pay $11 million to settle federal allegations 
that it had used illegal immigrants to clean its stores. Oct 2005: Wal-Mart is 
trying to reshape itself as a kinder, gentler company. Oct 2006: Wal-Mart 
must pay at least $78.5 million for violating Pennsylvania labor laws. 
 
   
Notes.  The  dates  in  the  first  column  are  the  periods  during  which  the  firm-specific  negative  sentiment 
measure has a permanent effect on returns, using the 252-day rolling window regressions. A permanent effect 
on returns is where (using equation 4) the first lag of sentiment on returns is significant and negative, and 
lags 1 to 5 of FN are jointly significant at the 10 percent level or better.     27 
 



















Notes. In this  figure  we depict for two sample  firms  – Ford Motor and Home 
Depot – the periods during which the firm-specific negative sentiment measure has 
permanent and transitory effects on returns, using equation 4 in 252-day rolling 
window regressions. A permanent effect on returns is where the first lag of FN on 
returns is significant and negative, and lags 1 to 5 of FN are jointly significant at 
the 10 percent level or better. A transitory effect on returns is where first lag of FN 
on returns is significant and lags 1 to 5 of FN are jointly insignificant.     